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Mrror mod.use z = False
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  "Selected" + str(modifie
  rror ob.select = 0
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          or to the selected
    ect.mirror_mirror_x
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```

AN OFFERING IN THE BLUE CYBER SERIES

Phishing Resistant Authentication

By Andrew Regenscheid

National Institute of Standards and Technology



26 September 2023







Phishing-Resistant Authentication

Andrew Regenscheid

PIV Technical Lead

NIST Information Technology Laboratory


Disclaimer




Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials are identified in this presentation in order to describe the concepts adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

Phishing









Phishing






Cybersecurity Incidents






Data breaches leveraged Phishing attacks¹



Attacks used involved stolen credentials to gain access¹



Organizations have faced successful phishing attacks²


Sources:

¹ 2023 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon

² 2023 State of the Phish, Proofpoint

Phishing Attacks on Authentication






<u>Authentication</u>



Authentication is meant to provide confidence that the returning user is the same that took part in the registration process

Authentication is accomplished through some combination of three factors:

- Something you know a password
- **Something you have** one-time passcode (OTP) sent to a device, a USB security key
- Something you are an image of your face or your fingerprint



Multi-factor Authentication Examples



	SMS OTP A code that is texted or delivered via audio	OTP Apps App that generates timebound codes	Push Authentication App that sends approval requests to a user	Security Keys Key for authentication stored on a device	Cryptographic Apps Key for authentication stored through software
Examples	"your verification code is 1234. Don't share this with anyone else!"	Google & Microsoft Authenticators	"Press 'approve' if you are attempting to access"	Yubikey, Google Titan, PIV Cards	FaceID, Windows Hello, passkeys
The Good	Anyone with a phone can use it!	Easy to useSIM Swap protectionCan be done offline	 Easy to use SIM Swap protection Some phishing protection 	 Highly secure Phishing resistant Local MFA option Biometric unlock option 	 Highly secure Phishing resistant "Passwordless" MFA Biometric unlock option
The Bad	 Highly phishable Connection required SIM Swap Network attacks Carrier trust reliance 	 Highly phishable App required Smart phone required 	 Connection required App required User vigilance required "MFA exhaustion" 	Another "thing"Expensive	 Smart device required Not user friendly Limited market availability

Phishing Resistance



Increased sophistication in phishing attacks as MFA adoption has grown

Steal static authenticators, e.g., passwords

Relay dynamic authenticators, e.g., OTP

Phishing resistant authentication methods address threat vectors:

- Block impersonated websites from capturing authentication data
- Stop Attacker-in-the-Middle from capturing and relaying authentication data from the user to the legitimate website
- Prevent *replay attacks* that reuse stolen authentication data
- Avoid user entry of secrets that will be sent over the internet

OMB M-22-09 requires federal agencies to offer a phishing-resistant authentication option to public users



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

January 26, 2022

M-22-0

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

ROM: Shalanda D. Young

Director Shalanda D. 4

SUBJECT: Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles

This memorandum sets forth a Federal zero trust architecture (ZTA) strategy, requiring agencies to meet specific cybersecurity standards and objectives by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 in order to reinforce the Government's defenses against increasingly sophisticated and persistent threat campaigns. Those campaigns target Federal technology infrastructure, threatening public safety and privacy, damaging the American economy, and weakening trust in Government.

I. OVERVIEW

Every day, the Federal Government executes unique and deeply challenging missions: agencies¹ safeguard our nation's critical infrastructure, conduct scientific research, engage in diplomacy, and provide benefits and services for the American people, among many other public functions. To deliver on these missions effectively, our nation must make intelligent and vigorous use of modern technology and security practices, while avoiding disruption by malicious cyber campaigns.

Successfully modernizing the Federal Government's approach to security requires a Government-wide endeavor. In May of 2021, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 14028, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, initiating a sweeping Government-wide effort to ensure that baseline security practices are in place, to migrate the Federal Government to a zero trust architecture, and to realize the security benefits of cloud-based infrastructure while mitigating associated risks.

As used in this memorandum, "agency" has the meaning given in 44 U.S.C. § 3502.

² Exec. Order No. 14028, 86 Fed. Reg. 26633 (2021). https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-10460

Phishing Resistant Methods





Channel Binding— e.g., PKI Certificates with Client-Authenticated TLS

- Authentication bound to TLS session between client/server
- Strong security properties mitigating web vulnerabilities/attacks
- Requires PKI and and user certificates




Verifier Name Binding— *e.g., WebAuthn/FIDO2*

- Authentication bound to web origin/domain
- Prevents relay attacks by lookalike/phishing web sites
- Authenticators embedded in platforms or as standalone tokens

PKI Certificates and Client-Auth TLS




- Cryptographic authentication using credentials issued to users from trusted Certificate Authorities
- **Examples:** Credentials may be stored on:
 - Smart Cards— PIV, CAC, PIV-I
 - Embedded in device/OS key stores
 - USB tokens
- Strong two-way authentication between the user and the website or application prevents phishing and relay attacks
- Widely used within the federal government
- Significant infrastructure required to deploy and use, limiting commercial use



WebAuthn, FIDO and Passkeys



- Cryptographic authentication using public key credentials bound to user accounts
 - Uses website-specific credentials to protect security and privacy
 - Credentials must be created and registered at each website/application
- **Examples:** Credentials may be stored and used on:
 - USB/NFC Security Keys
 - Platform authenticators embedded in mobile devices and PCs
- Resists phishing attacks by:
 - Using website-specific credentials scoped to domain name
 - Browsers will not use legitimate credentials on lookalike phishing sites
- Can register multiple authenticators on each website to mitigate risk of loss
- Commercial support rapidly increasing



NIST Digital Identity Guidelines



- NIST SP 800-63 details the process and technical requirements for Digital Identity
- Four volumes:
 - Base Digital Identity Model and Risk Management
 - A Identity Proofing & Enrollment
 - B Authentication & Lifecycle Management
 - C Federation & Assertions
- Major draft revision was in December 2022

NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63-4 ipd Digital Identity Guidelines

Initial Public Draft

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-4.ipd

December 2022



U.S. Department of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Laurie E. Locascio, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

SP 800-63B Overview




Scope: Authentication and Lifecycle Management

- Authenticators to authenticate *subjects* to *relying parties*.
- Authentication processes and protocols used by verifiers.
- Lifecycle:
 - Authenticator Selection and equity considerations
 - Authenticator Binding/Issuance
 - Session management
 - Account recovery

ldentity Proofing and Enrollment

Authentication Assurance Levels

AAL1	Single-factor authentication
AAL2	 Multifactor authentication Supports implementation of EO 14028 and EO 13681 for MFA
AAL3	 Hardware-based, cryptographic multifactor authentication Phishing resistant in support of OMB M -22-09 Supported by PIV at federal agencies, consistent with HSPD-12



Additional Resources



NIST Guidelines

- NIST SP 800-64-4, Initial Public Draft, Digital Identity Guidelines, December 2022
- NIST SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines, June 2017

NIST Informative Materials:

- Blog: <u>Phishing Resistance Protecting the Keys to Your Kingdom</u>
- Video: <u>Protecting Your Small Business: Phishing</u>
- Video: <u>Introducing Phish Scale</u>

CISA Guidance:

Implementing Phishing Resistant MFA



Questions

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